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This paper analyzes the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on unemployment and economic eﬃ-
ciency in a matching model with homogenous agents when wages and working hours are bargained
over. I show that the theoretical impact of a higher marginal tax rate on unemployment is ambigu-
ous whatever the instantaneous utility in unemployment i.e. for an utility in unemployment that
is either ﬁxed or perfectly indexed on net wages. These results are in sharp contrast with the liter-
ature. Numerical simulations applied to France suggest that a higher marginal tax rate generally
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11 Introduction
Average and marginal tax rates aﬀecting low-paid jobs have decreased the last twenty years in many
countries (e.g. the E.I.T.C. in the US, the W.F.T.C. in UK, reductions in social security contributions
in France). Since it is recognized that these policies were beneﬁcial in terms of employment to the
low-paid employees, many governments wonder if these policies should be intensiﬁed. However, these
policies might have generated costs because of the induced increase in the marginal tax rate for
average-paid groups 1. Therefore, it is important to shed light on the eﬀects of a higher marginal tax
rate on equilibrium unemployment and social eﬃciency, two crucial economic dimensions for assessing
the eﬀects of taxes. These are the two main objectives of this article.
The theoretical framework is based on the matching model (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
and Pissarides (2000)) with endogenous working hours 2. Firms post job vacancies at a ﬁxed cost.
Matching frictions create search externalities and generate rents that are shared between workers and
ﬁrms through Nash-bargaining over wages and hours. Two traditional eﬀects found in the literature
analyzing the impact of an increase in the marginal tax rate are present in my model. First, by
excluding labor supply income eﬀects (as is usually done in the literature), a higher marginal tax
rate distorts working hours through a substitution eﬀect 3. Second, the wage moderating eﬀect of a
higher marginal tax rate (henceforth called the standard wage moderating eﬀect) was put forward in
the literature that considers imperfect labor markets with ﬁxed hours 4. A higher marginal tax rate
(keeping average tax rates ﬁxed) implies that the labor cost becomes more sensitive to an increase in
the net wage. Moreover, in the presence of positive taxes, a rise in the marginal tax rate implies that
an increase in gross wages has a reduced impact on net wages. Therefore, it becomes less rewarding for
workers to bargain aggressively and wages fall. This in turn stimulates labor demand and decreases
unemployment.
Three new theoretical ﬁndings are put forward in this paper. By taking endogenous working
1Their average tax rates might have also decreased. However, for the average-paid groups, marginal tax rates are
much more aﬀected than average tax rates (especially in France, see The OECD Tax Database).
2In the paper, I use the term “working hours” to refer to the more general notion of “intensive labor supply margin”
which encompasses all types of in-work eﬀorts.
3Even if the intensity of the reaction remains controversial, the negative impact of the marginal tax rate on the labor
supply intensive margin has been widely empirically recognized (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Blundell (2000) and
OECD (2002)).
4This eﬀect has been highlighted in theoretical and empirical studies for many countries (see Hersoug (1984), Mal-
comson and Sartor (1987), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Sørensen (1997), Pissarides
(1998) and Røed and Stroem (2002), among others).
2hours into account, I enrich the standard wage moderating eﬀect through two channels emerging from
indirect (“feedback”) macroeconomic equilibrium eﬀects. First, the decrease in working hours due to
a higher marginal tax rate reduces ﬁrm’s net proﬁt and thus the possibilities for ﬁrms to recover their
vacancy costs. Firm’s total proﬁt being lower, fewer ﬁrms enter the market and the probability for
workers to match a vacancy decreases. This in turn decreases workers’ wage claims. Therefore, this
eﬀect, henceforth called the scale economy eﬀect, reinforces the standard wage moderating eﬀect of the
marginal tax rate. The second eﬀect emerges from utility in unemployment. The paper considers two
polar cases for the instantaneous utility in unemployment. When this utility is perfectly indexed to net
wages (i.e. the Bismarckian component of the unemployment compensation), the wage rate decreases
when the marginal tax rate increases. When this utility is ﬁxed (e.g. the Beveridgian component of
the unemployment compensation or the utility of leisure), an increase in the marginal tax rate has an
ambiguous impact on the wage rate. Indeed, the scale economy and the standard wage moderating
eﬀects coupled with the reduction in working hours increase the net replacement ratio and thus the
reservation wage. Employees are then more reluctant to accept a decrease in their wage rate: This
is the net replacement ratio eﬀect. This eﬀect on the wage rate can dominate the scale economy and
the standard wage moderating eﬀects, especially when the ﬁxed utility level in unemployment and the
labor supply elasticity are high. Finally, I show that even if the hourly proﬁt increases through a
possible decrease in the wage rate, the eﬀects of a higher marginal tax rate on the proﬁt per worker
are ambiguous because the possibilities to recover the vacancy costs decrease. As a consequence, the
impact of a higher marginal tax rate on labor demand and unemployment is undetermined.
Numerical simulations applied to France are also provided, an exercise that few papers analyzing
this problem propose. The simulations indicate to what extent the eﬀect on unemployment relies on
three important dimensions: The level of utility in unemployment, whether the replacement ratio is
constant or not and the labor supply elasticity. They show also that the evolution of social eﬃciency
is essentially dictated by working hours. Furthermore, they point out two striking ﬁndings. First,
except for extreme values of the parameters, increasing the marginal tax rate improves employment
but deteriorates social eﬃciency. Second, the evolution of the optimal marginal tax rate with respect
to the labor supply elasticity is not monotonic.
Three branches of the literature are linked to my paper. A ﬁrst literature focusing on imperfect
3labor markets has stressed the importance of distinguishing the unemployment compensation regimes.
However, Pissarides (1998), Holmlund (2002), Altenburg and Schaub (2002), Kilponen and Sinko
(2005) and Van der Ploeg (2006) do not analyze the eﬀects of an increase in tax progression 5. In a
union model, Holmlund and Kolm (1995) show that the qualitative eﬀects of the marginal tax rate
(taking average tax rates as given) on unemployment are the same in each regime. It turns out that
this latter property is lost when the labor supply is endogenous in a search model.
Second, other articles have enriched the standard wage moderating eﬀect of the marginal tax rate
by incorporating an intensive labor supply margin. The vast majority of these studies have considered
union models. Among others, Calmfors (1995), Sørensen (1999) and Hansen et al. (2000) have shown
that the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on the wage rate might be ambiguous 6. In contrast to my
paper, these analyses do not compare the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate when utility in unemployment
is ﬁxed or indexed on wages. Furthermore, except Sørensen (1999) and Fuest and Huber (2000), no
paper has analyzed the eﬀects on unemployment. However, these two papers show that a higher
marginal tax rate always reduces unemployment 7. This is due to the assumption, made in all these
union models, that ﬁrms consider men and hours as perfectly substitutable. This implies that ﬁrms
and unions compensate for a decrease in hours by an increase in employment. The matching model
is usually not characterized by such a property. However, Hansen (1999) does not share my scale
economy eﬀect since he considers that vacancy costs are proportional to hours, an assumption that is
not standard in the matching literature with endogenous hours (see Pissarides (2000)). Moreover, he
considers that utility in unemployment is equal to zero. This explains why Hansen obtains positive
employment eﬀects of a higher marginal tax rate in a matching model. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)
consider ﬁxed vacancy costs and a positive utility in unemployment. However, they also show that
the unemployment rate always decreases when the marginal tax rate is pushed up. This is due to the
worker’s utility function they consider and which is characterized by income and substitution eﬀects
that oﬀset each other when the initial tax system is proportional. My study and the analysis provided
in Cahuc and Zylberberg can be considered as complementary since empirical studies indicate that for
5Tax progression increases when the average tax rate increases with income. This occurs when the marginal tax rate
increases more than the average tax rate.
6The theoretical analysis of Andersen and Rasmussen (1999) has also shown that the marginal tax rate has an
ambiguous eﬀect on wages and employment in an eﬃciency wage setting with two levels of eﬀort.
7Fuest and Huber (2000) show that the impact on unemployment depends on the existence of labor supply income
eﬀects. However, the comparability of their article with my paper and the papers aforementioned is diﬃcult since possible
negative eﬀects of a higher marginal tax rate are due to income eﬀects emerging from a balanced government budget.
4some categories, the substitution eﬀect dominates signiﬁcantly the income eﬀect and for other (richer)
categories, the two eﬀects oﬀset each other (see Blundell (1995)).
The third literature analyzes the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on social eﬃciency. In a static
matching framework with ﬁxed hours, Boone and Bovenberg (2002) have shown that when the Hosios
condition is not satisﬁed 8, the optimal marginal tax rate increases with the worker’s bargaining
power in order to compensate for its possible negative eﬀects on trading externalities. This property
is in line with my results. My simulations are also consistent with the theoretical contribution of
Pissarides (1983). Even if the mechanisms are diﬀerent, the basic idea is the same. A higher utility
in unemployment implies a higher reservation wage, whose negative eﬀects are compensated for by a
higher marginal tax rate. Finally, the numerical simulations of Sørensen (1999) emphasize that the
optimal tax progression decreases sharply with the labor supply elasticity. My simulations reveal a
non-monotonic relation between the optimal marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity. This
important diﬀerence is explained by the fact that the scale economy eﬀect induced by search frictions
and the net replacement ratio eﬀect induced by a ﬁxed component in the utility in unemployment are
absent in Sørensen (1999).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the theoretical eﬀects of a




The framework is the matching model developed in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides
(2000). For the sake of simplicity, I restrict my analysis to the steady-state equilibrium and time
variables are omitted. Agents are homogenous but transaction costs imply that vacant jobs and
unemployed workers meet through an imperfect matching process. The matching function M (U,V )
gives the number of matches that are formed in the market at each instant. This number is a function
8This condition expresses the fact that without taxation and with exogenous hours, a decentralized wage formation
internalizes the trading externalities due to the matching frictions. This condition is satisﬁed when the worker’s bargaining
power is equal to the elasticity of the matching function (see Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000)).
5of the total number of agents searching for a job, U 9, and of the (endogenous) number of vacant jobs
V at each instant. The matching function satisﬁes the standard assumptions i.e. it is increasing in
each argument, continuously diﬀerentiable, homogenous of degree one and yields no hiring if U or V
is nil.
Denoting by θ ≡ V




q′ (θ) < 0






Normalizing the labor force to 1, the unemployment rate in each period is U. The entry ﬂows into
employment are therefore equal to Uθq(θ). I assume that negative idiosyncratic shocks arrive at an
exogenous rate λ. These shocks lead to the destruction of the job and to the entry of the worker into
unemployment. Therefore, the ﬂows into unemployment are λ(1 − U). Thus, the unemployment rate





In the following sections, I introduce the characteristics of each participant in the labor market.
2.1.1 Workers
Workers have no aversion to risk, are inﬁnitely living and their discount rate is r. They are either
unemployed or employed. An unemployed worker searches for a job and has an unemployment utility
of B. I assume that there is no cost of search i.e. that the extensive margin of the labor supply is
absent 10. The expected value of the stream of income of an unemployed worker at the stationary
9Ljundqvist and Sargent (1995) study the eﬀects of taxation with on-the-job-search but they consider an exogenous
intensive labor supply margin. I don’t allow for on-the-job-search in order to simplify the analysis.
10It is however possible to interpret the unemployment utility B as an utility net of exogenous search costs. Lehmann
and Van der Linden (2004) analyze the eﬀects of ﬁscal progression with an endogeneous search eﬀort but with an
exogeneous labour supply intensive margin.
6equilibrium is:
rVu = B + θq(θ)(Ve − Vu) (2)
where Ve represents the expected present value of the stream of income of a worker who is employed
at the stationary equilibrium. I distinguish two polar cases for utility in unemployment. In the
ﬁrst case, one has B = ρ(WH − T (WH)) with ρ the (ﬁxed) net replacement ratio. In the second
case, I consider an extreme form of endogenous net replacement ratio by setting B at
_
B. One might
wonder if analyzing a ﬁxed utility in unemployment is relevant to a comparative steady state study.
In particular, one may argue that in the long run, utility in unemployment is necessarily perfectly
indexed on net wages. If it was not the case, unemployment would not be constant along a balanced
growth path. However two arguments support the relevance to analyze the eﬀects of a higher marginal
tax rate when utility in unemployment is ﬁxed. First, the costs involved by the acceptance of a job are
not only ﬁnancial (e.g. forgone leisure) and these costs are not necessarily proportional to the wage
rate obtained in the labor market (e.g. home production or revenues from working in the underground
economy). Second, since the transitory dynamics in matching models are quite short, the steady state
is attained in the medium run. Now, in the medium run, non human wealth or assistance beneﬁts
have not always enough time to adjust (for a discussion, see Pissarides (2000)) 11.
A worker is employed when he has been matched with a ﬁrm and has agreed with her on the
wage rate W 12 and the working hours H. Once the worker and the ﬁrm have reached an agreement,
production takes place, the employed worker earns WH and pays taxes T (WH). Working hours are
costly for workers. The disutility is denoted d(H). I consider a separable utility function which is
quasi-linear in consumption. Income eﬀects are therefore omitted. This assumption is also generally
made in the literature because it seems less important to take the income eﬀects into account when
one focuses on working hours rather than participation to the labor market. Moreover, Blundell
(1995) shows that the labor supply is an inverse-U shaped function of the net wage rate and that it
becomes ﬂatter when the net wage rate increases. However, the level of the wage rate from which the
substitution and the income eﬀects oﬀset each other is not precisely known. Finally, the great majority
of the literature has considered such a separable utility function so it allows for a better comparability
11Another argument that might give some support to the case of an endogenous net replacement ratio would be to
assume that wage taxes are used to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts, that the government budget is balanced and that
the average tax rate is held constant. However, I do not consider the government budget equilibrium constraint.
12W corresponds basically to the hourly cost of labor. Henceforth, I use the term wage rate for simplication.
7of my results with the literature. The disutility function is isoelastic and writes d(H) = ao ∗ Hα
α , ao
being a scale parameter. As is usual in the literature, this function is increasing and convex, which
implies that the elasticity of the disutility of labor α is higher than 1 13. Finally, an employed worker
looses his job at a rate λ. Thus, one has:
rVe = WH − T (WH) − ao
Hα
α
+ λ(Vu − Ve) (3)
2.1.2 Firms
There is an endogenous number of ﬁrms producing a single good (whose price is normalized to one)
with labor as only input. It is sold in a perfectly competitive market. As is standard in the matching
literature, I consider small ﬁrms (i.e. each ﬁrm restricts to one job) characterized by a discount rate
equal to r. When the job is vacant the ﬁrm is searching for a worker. The ﬁxed vacancy cost being
C, the asset value on a vacant job at the stationary equilibrium veriﬁes:
rJv = −C + q(θ)(Jf − Jv) (4)
with Jf, the asset value of a ﬁlled job. Once a ﬁrm has met a worker and has agreed on the wage
rate and the working hours, she produces a ﬁxed number of product per hour, Y . This assumption is
consistent with the medium run period on which I focus. It implies that ﬁrms aim at maximizing the
total number of hours worked in a job in order to recover their vacancy costs. Since a job is destroyed
at a constant rate λ, the asset value of a ﬁlled job writes:
rJf = (Y − W)H + λ(Jv − Jf) (5)
In order to shed light on the intuitions behind the eﬀects of a higher marginal tax rate, I present
gradually its underlying mechanisms. Therefore, I analyze the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on the
equilibrium relations before presenting its total eﬀects on hours, wages and unemployment.
13The elasticity of the disutility of labor is related to the elasticity of the labor supply η in the following way: α = 1+
1
η.
82.2 Eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on the equilibrium relations
Before analyzing the eﬀects of an increase in the marginal tax rate on wage formation and labor
demand relations, it is necessary to bring up two assumptions used in the paper and usually adopted
in the literature. The ﬁrst assumption consists in leaving out the government’s budget constraint
from the analysis. Two reasons explain this assumption. First, it allows to consider the marginal tax
rate as a parameter i.e. to study the eﬀects of variations in the marginal tax rate taking the average
tax rate as given. Second, a lump-sum tax/subsidy given to all the agents may insure a balanced
budget constraint without aﬀecting the results. The second assumption is that the matching function
is Cobb Douglas. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of unemployed,
γ (γ ≡ −
θq′(θ)
q(θ) ), is thus constant and lower than 1. This function is frequently used in the literature
and is supported by empirical analyses (see e.g. Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Pissarides (2000)
and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)).
2.2.1 Eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on wage formation
I consider an eﬃcient bargaining process between matched ﬁrms and workers i.e. the wage rate and
the working hours are simultaneously bargained. Considering that workers choose their working hours
would introduce a bias toward a lower decrease in wage rates following an increase in the marginal tax
rate. Firms would take into account the negative eﬀects of a higher marginal tax rate on hours and
would have to compensate for these eﬀects by a smaller decrease in the wage rate (see Hansen (1999)).
Introducing this mechanism would thus yield more complex relations and limit the understanding of
my speciﬁc mechanisms.
Matched ﬁrms and workers share their rents through a Nash bargaining process. The negotiation
is decentralized in the sense that the outside options are taken as given by the players. Denoting β




β (Jf − Jv)
1−β
The F.O.C. yield the following working hours relation:





dH is the marginal tax rate. Relation (6) expresses the fact that the
marginal cost of an additional working hour (the marginal disutility of work) has to be equal to
its marginal beneﬁt (the hourly productivity minus additional taxes) for the worker-ﬁrm pair. The
properties of working hours are standard: The number of hours increases with Y and the reactions
to an increase in the marginal tax rate are decreasing in α (i.e. increasing with the labor supply
elasticity).
The free entry condition of ﬁrms implies that Jv = 0. Therefore, deﬁning the average tax rate by
TM ≡
T(WH)
WH , the wage rate is given by:
W =
βY (1 − Tm) + (1 − β)
(ao∗Hα/α+rVu)
H
β (1 − Tm) + (1 − β)(1 − TM)
(7)
The wage rate increases with productivity Y , the worker’s bargaining power β and the worker’s
reservation wage rVu. The eﬀect of working hours on the wage rate is ambiguous. Consider the eﬀects
of an increase in the marginal tax rate. On the one hand, by pushing down the disutility of labor
ao ∗ Hα−1, a decrease in hours reduces the necessary wage rate compensation. On the other hand,
there are “feedback” eﬀects emerging from the macroeconomic equilibrium since the reservation wage
is aﬀected by taxation. In order to capture the total eﬀect of the marginal tax rate on the wage rate at
the steady state macroeconomic equilibrium, it is necessary to distinguish the unemployment utility
regimes.
Eﬀects of the marginal tax rate in the ﬁxed net replacement ratio regime.
Using relations (2), (3), taking into account that Jv = 0 in relation (5), and replacing the expression
of B, the F.O.C. of the Nash bargaining program yields the wage relation WS :
W =
Y β (1 − Tm) + (1 − β) ∗ ao
H(Tm)α−1
α g(θ)
β (1 − Tm) + (1 − β)(1 − ρ)(1 − TM)g(θ)
(8)
with g(θ) ≡ r+λ
r+λ+θq(θ) (and thus g′ (θ) < 0) and where H (Tm) is obtained by relation (6). This
relation deﬁnes an increasing curve in the (θ,W) plan 14 because when the labor market tightness is
high, agents who have met a ﬁrm exert a stronger pressure on wages.
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Figure 1: Eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on W and θ. E is the initial equilibrium. When the utility
in unemployment is perfectly indexed on net wages, the possible new equilibria are E1 and E2. When
the utility in unemployment is ﬁxed, possible new equilibria are E1, E2, E21 and E22.
An increase in the marginal tax rate shifts the WS curve to the South-East region (i.e. from WS
to WS′
1 on Figure 1). This is due to two eﬀects. An increase in the gross wage rate is less favorable
to the employee which gives him less incentives to be aggressive in the bargaining process and this
reduces the wage rate. This is the standard wage moderating eﬀect of a higher marginal tax rate




< 0 15). The impact of an increase in the
marginal tax rate on hours ampliﬁes this eﬀect. The increase in the marginal tax rate diminishes
working hours, reduces labor disutility and thus the ﬁnancial compensation asked by the employee.
15The small letters correspond to the diﬀerentiated variables (e.g. for H, one has h =
dH
H ).
11Eﬀects of the marginal tax rate in the ﬁxed unemployment utility regime.
In this regime, the wage relation WS writes:
W =









β (1 − Tm) + (1 − β)(1 − TM)g(θ)
(9)
where H (Tm) is determined by relation (6). Since the analysis of this relation is very close to the
preceding one, I only comment on the diﬀerences. The term
_
B/H (Tm) captures this diﬀerence and
shows that the net replacement ratio rises when the marginal tax rate increases. As a response to
this eﬀect, employed workers aim at limiting the decrease in their wage rate. This net replacement
ratio eﬀect, that emerges exclusively from the introduction of working hours is new in the literature.
It suggests that when utility in unemployment
_
B and the labor supply elasticity are suﬃciently high,
an increase in the marginal tax rate does not necessarily decrease the wage rate (this case is displayed
in Figure 1 by the curve WS′
2, the shift WS′
1 corresponding to the usual case put forward in the
literature). Thus, the eﬀect of working hours on the wage rate is ambiguous
2.2.2 Eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on aggregate labor demand
The free entry condition implies that ﬁrms decide to enter the market as long as their intertemporal
discounted expected proﬁt on a ﬁlled job is equal to the average cost of a vacant job. Thus, at the





Substituting this relation and relation (6) in relation (5), one obtains the aggregate labor demand
(called also the price relation):







C (r + λ)




The curve associated to this relation is decreasing and convex in the (θ,W) plan (see Figure
1). Ceteris paribus, an increase in the wage rate decreases the intertemporal proﬁt on a ﬁlled job
and thus the total number of vacant jobs and labor market tightness. The tax system aﬀects this
12relation through working hours. An increase in the marginal tax rate pushes down working hours
and diminishes the possibilities for ﬁrms to recover their sunk vacancy costs. As a consequence, for a
given wage rate, the decrease in hours diminishes the expected proﬁts on ﬁlled jobs and restricts the
number of ﬁrms. Thus, an increase in the marginal tax rate shifts the aggregate labor demand curve
PS to the South-West region (from PS to PS′ on Figure 1).
As is shown in Figure 1, the eﬀect of the marginal tax rate on employment is ambiguous. In the
ﬁxed net replacement ratio regime, the wage rate decreases as the marginal tax rate increases but
the eﬀect on employment depends on the extent of the shift of the PS curve. For a ﬁxed utility in
unemployment, an increase in the marginal tax rate might imply an increase in the wage rate and in
the unemployment rate.
Before investigating what are the key variables governing the results, it is important to determine
the conditions under which the equilibrium exists. The curves WS and PS deﬁning the equilibrium
are respectively increasing and decreasing. When an equilibrium exists, it is therefore unique. In
Appendix A, it is shown that an equilibrium exists in the ﬁxed net replacement ratio regime when
the condition (1 − β)
￿1−Tm
α − (1 − ρ)(1 − TM)
￿
< 0 is satisﬁed. In the ﬁxed utility in unemployment
regime, an equilibrium exists when the condition (1 − β)
￿
Y (1−Tm)






satisﬁed. Intuitively, these conditions express the fact that ﬁrms’ and workers’ rents are positive.
Henceforth, I assume that these conditions hold.
2.3 Eﬀects of an increase in the marginal tax rate on hours, wages and unemploy-
ment
The relations describing the total eﬀects of an increase in the marginal tax rate on wages and unem-
ployment are very complex. Thus, in order to simplify the presentation and to capture the intuitions
of the mechanisms, my analysis is based on the study of total elasticities ξI,Tm of the endogenous vari-
ables I with respect to the marginal tax rate Tm (the average tax rate remaining ﬁxed). Moreover, the
total elasticities ξI,Tm are expressed as functions of the partial elasticities εP
I,Z emerging from relations
(6), (8) or (9) and (10) (Z corresponds thus to endogenous or exogenous variables). More intuitively,
the total elasticities emerge from the macroeconomic equilibrium and the partial elasticities are related
to the relations at the microeconomic level. The proofs of the results are in Appendix B.
13Since working hours are solely aﬀected by the marginal tax rate, the elasticity of working hours







This elasticity increases (in absolute value) with the labor supply elasticity and with the initial mar-
ginal tax rate. When the initial marginal tax rate is high, working hours are initially highly distorted.
A further increase in the marginal tax rate increases more the hours distortion than when the initial
marginal tax rate is low.
Since the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on the wage relations are diﬀerent in each unemployment
utility regime, it is necessary to distinguish them.
2.3.1 The ﬁxed net replacement ratio regime





















The impact of an increase in the marginal tax rate on the wage rate is inﬂuenced by three eﬀects.
When the intensive margin is exogenous (i.e. when ξH,Tm is equal to zero), the ﬁrst term in the
numerator and the denominator are solely present. The term ε
p
W,Tm represents the standard wage
moderating eﬀect. It is weakened by a feedback macroeconomic eﬀect since the decrease in the wage
rate pushes up labor demand and labor market tightness. Since the term in the denominator is higher
than 1 16, the ﬁnal variation of the wage rate following an increase in the marginal tax rate is lower
than the variation at the microeconomic level (ξW,Tm < ε
p
W,Tm). The intensity of this feedback eﬀect
depends on ε
p
W,θ and the matching function elasticity γ. ε
p
W,θ measures the intensity of the wage
rate variation when the labor market tightness is modiﬁed. 1
γ gives the eﬀectiveness of vacancies to
generate matching. The higher ε
p
W,θ/γ, the higher the increase in the labor market tightness when the









Jf,W < 0 with ε
p
Jf,W the elasticity (at ﬁxed hours) of the proﬁt on a ﬁlled job with respect to
the wage rate.
14of the employees. Thus, the higher ε
p
W,θ/γ, the smaller is the ﬁnal decrease in the wage rate when the
marginal tax rate is raised.
Taking an endogenous labor supply into account adds a new eﬀect, the scale economy eﬀect, which






∗ξH,Tm. A higher marginal tax rate pushes working hours down. This
reduces ﬁrms’ net ﬂow proﬁts and thus the possibilities for ﬁrms to recover their vacancy costs. Firms’
expected proﬁt is therefore decreased and from relation (10), this implies that labor demand and labor
market tightness diminish. These induced eﬀects push down the wage rate in the negotiations. The




Finally, since the standard wage moderating eﬀect and the scale economy eﬀect aﬀect similarly the
wage rate, the wage rate decreases with the marginal tax rate. However, even if the hourly proﬁt on
a ﬁlled job is pushed up, total proﬁt and labor demand do not necessarily increase with the marginal
tax rate. The eﬀects of a variation in the marginal tax rate on the unemployment rate are captured
by the variation in the expected proﬁt on a ﬁlled job. Log-diﬀerentiating the Beveridge relation (1),
one has:







with ξJf,Tm, the elasticity of the proﬁt on a ﬁlled job with respect to the marginal tax rate. This
elasticity is given by (using the log-diﬀerentiation of relation (5) with Jv = 0):
ξJf,Tm = ξH,Tm + ε
p
Jf,WξW,Tm (13)
ξH,Tm has a negative impact on the numerator of ξJf,Tm but ε
p
Jf,WξW,Tm, which measures the
transmission of a variation in Tm on ﬁrm’s proﬁt Jf (and thus on labor demand) through the wage
rate channel, has a positive inﬂuence on ξJf,Tm. Thus, the elasticity of the unemployment rate with
respect to the marginal tax rate is more likely positive when the labor supply elasticity (i.e. ξH,Tm) is
high. A higher marginal tax rate diminishes the wage rate and working hours. When the labor supply
elasticity is suﬃciently high, the loss due to the lower scale economy possibilities is not covered by
the gain coming from the decrease in the wage rate. In this case, although the hourly proﬁt increases,
total proﬁt, labor demand and employment decline.
This result is summarized in the following proposition:
15Proposition 1 For a ﬁxed net replacement ratio, an increase in the marginal tax rate diminishes the
wage rate and has an indeterminate impact on the unemployment rate. The higher the elasticity of
the labor supply, the more likely the unemployment rate increases.
2.3.2 The ﬁxed utility in unemployment regime























The analysis of this regime is close to the latter one. Therefore, I only comment the diﬀerences. A
new term appears in the numerator. The term ε
p
W,H ∗ξH,Tm is negative and emerges from the impact
of working hours on the wage rate through the net replacement ratio eﬀect. Lower working hours
increase the net replacement ratio and render the situation of the unemployed less “unattractive”.
This eﬀect tends to increase the wage claim of the employees. Moreover, the intensity of this eﬀect
increases with the labor supply elasticity. The total eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on the wage rate
is therefore ambiguous.
It is interesting to assess the inﬂuence of the level of utility in unemployment to understand how
important the net replacement ratio eﬀect can be. To do this, compare two economies (or two diﬀerent
groups in a same economy) diﬀering only by their level of utility in unemployment. As is shown in
Appendix C, the higher the level of utility in unemployment, the more likely the wage rate increases
when the marginal tax rate increases. Basically, when hours decrease, the increase in the net replace-
ment ratio (and the reservation wage) is pushed up by the level of utility in unemployment. Thus,
employees resist more to the wage rate moderating eﬀects of the marginal tax rate. As a consequence,
the unemployment rate is more likely to increase when the level of utility in unemployment is high.
The next Proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 For a ﬁxed utility in unemployment, an increase in the marginal tax rate has an
ambiguous impact on the wage rate and the unemployment rate. The higher the utility in unemployment
and/or the higher the labor supply elasticity, the more likely the wage rate and the unemployment rate
increase.
163 Numerical simulations
This section is devoted to the study of three questions. The theoretical analysis suggests that the
total eﬀect of the marginal tax rate on employment might be diﬀerent when utility in unemployment
is ﬁxed or indexed on net wages. However, real world falls between these two polar cases. The
numerical simulations intend therefore to assess which eﬀect dominates. The second objective of the
simulations consists in determining what is the eﬀect of the marginal tax rate on economic eﬃciency,
deﬁned as the total net product minus a possible government budget deﬁcit, which writes 17:
  = [Y H − d(H) + WHTM](1 − U) − U
￿_
B + ρWH (1 − TM)
￿
− CUθ (15)
The impact on   is a priori ambiguous since the eﬀect on unemployment is not signed and the impact
on working hours is negative. Moreover, an important objective of this analysis consists in shedding
light on an eventual political economy problem. More precisely, a central planner whose objective is
not only social economic eﬃciency but also employment might be confronted with a dilemma. Finally,
this section assesses the quantitative eﬀects of the parameters on the optimal marginal tax rate. The
optimal marginal tax rate is deﬁned as the marginal tax rate that maximizes economic eﬃciency when
the average tax rate characterizing the french population studied is ﬁxed.
This section is organized as follows. First, I explain how the model is calibrated. Second, I report
the results of the numerical simulations.
3.1 Calibration
The model is characterized by two types of parameters: The parameters which value is “known” and
the parameters to which I attribute a value in order to reproduce some stylized facts characterizing
the French economy in 2000. The reference period is the year because wage negotiations in France
take place generally each year since the Auroux laws of 1982.
The baseline parameters summarized in Table 1 are the following. The matching function is a Cobb
Douglas, so M (U,V ) = doUγV 1−γ with do a scale parameter. The empirical analyses of Blanchard and
17One might wonder why   does not encompass home production. This is because I restrict my analysis to the
unemployment compensation. However, I have made other simulations by taking a home production into account and
the results were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected. This is because   is much more aﬀected by gross production than by the
government budget -or the home production.
17Diamond (1990), Broersma and Van Ours (1999) and Pissarides (2000) show that the Cobb Douglas
function is a good approximation and they ﬁnd that γ = 0.5. It is diﬃcult to assess empirically the
order of magnitude of β. Thus, I use the conventional assumption of an equal bargaining power for the
ﬁrm and the worker i.e. β = 0.5. Thus, the Hosios condition is satisﬁed. The empirical estimations
of the labor supply elasticity conduct to very diﬀerent levels. The labor supply of male workers is
found to be quite inelastic (0.1) while the elasticity of married women and lone parents is found to be
much more elastic (from 0.7 to 1). Therefore, I set the elasticity of the labor supply η to an average
value of 0.4 which seems consistent with Blundell (1995), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Roed
and Stroem (2002). The discount rate is set at 0 to obtain ﬁgures consistent with the deﬁnition of
economic eﬃciency in relation (15) 18. The job destruction rate is given by the evaluations of the
OECD (1995) and is equal to 20%. The OECD deﬁnes wage categories with respect to the wage
of the average product worker (APW). My simulations focus on this category for several reasons.
First, the level of the wage rate of the APW is such that it is not directly aﬀected by the minimum
wage (see CSERC (1999)). Secondly, this is the category that would be aﬀected by an increase
in the marginal tax rate if the subsidies or social security contribution reductions on low-paid jobs
(roughly those paid at the minimum wage) were intensiﬁed. Finally, the linear tax rate assumed in the
paper is quite representative for the APW category (see Laroque (2005)). The tax wedge evaluations
are found in the OECD Tax Database. In 2000, the average tax rate of the labor cost is equal to
48.2% and the marginal tax rate of the labor cost is equal to 52.9% 19. I set the initial wage rate
at 100 and the initial number of hours at 1. Finally, Martin (1996) provides evaluations of the net
replacement rate for diﬀerent qualiﬁcation categories. He ﬁnds a total net replacement rate of 65% 20
for individuals with an “average” qualiﬁcation, a good approximation of the APW category. Moreover,
the unemployment compensation French system is linear (see OECD (2000)). The Beveridgian and
the Bismarckian components of the unemployment compensation are calculated on the basis of the
UNEDIC unemployment compensation general regime. ρ, the component indexed on net wages, is
equal to 0.4. This yields a ﬁxed component of utility in unemployment equal to
_
B = 12.9.
The second group of parameters is ﬁxed in order to reproduce some key ﬁgures of the French
18The results wouldn’t have been changed if I had taken a positive r.
19These taxes include: “The combined central and sub-central government income tax plus employee and employer
social security contribution taxes, as a percentage of labour costs deﬁned as gross wage earnings plus employer social
security contributions” (see The OECD Tax Database).
20This ﬁgure is in line with the OECD Social Indicators (2005).
18W H TM Tm Uo ρ
_
B λ r η
APW 100 1 0.482 0.529 0.1 0.4 12.9 0.2 0 0.4
Table 1: Baseline parameters for the French labour market.
Y Co θo ao do
APW 101 48.22 0.18 47.55 4.24
Table 2: The calibrated parameters in the benchmark.
population. Five variables have to be evaluated: The scale parameter of the matching function do, the
initial labor market tightness θo, the workers productivity Y , the scale parameter of the disutility of
work ao and the vacancy cost Co. The matching function scale parameter and the initial labor market
tightness are evaluated by using the unemployment rate and the rate at which a vacant job is ﬁlled.
I take a reasonable initial unemployment rate Uo of 10%. The rate at which vacant jobs are ﬁlled is
given by Maillard (1997) and is equal to 5 weeks approximately. Since the reference period is the year,
one obtains q(θ) = 10. The value of Y is then deduced from the wage formation relation (19) (see
Appendix D). The parameter ao is deduced from the working hours relation (6). Finally, I obtain the
vacancy cost Co from the labor demand relation (10). Table 2 summarizes the values of the calibrated
parameters in the benchmark economy.
In order to verify the validity of my calibration exercise, I check if some parameters computed
take reasonable values. To do this, I compare the data available for some parameters with their value
induced by my calibration. First, my calibration yields a vacancy cost of 4.8% of the total yearly labor
cost. This ﬁgure seems reasonable since it is in the range of the empirical estimations of Hamermesh
(1993) and Abowd and Kramarz (2003). Second, the calculations of the elasticity ξS
1−Tm of the total
wage S with respect to 1 − Tm have become very popular because this elasticity encompasses two
crucial ﬁscal distortion channels i.e. the wage bargaining and the in-work eﬀort (working hours and
eﬀort at work). I calculate this elasticity (see Appendix D) and ﬁnd a value equal to 0.417 21 which
is close to the average value of 0.4 reported in Gruber and Saez (2001).
21Fiscal distortions emerge therefore essentially through the working hours channel. This is partly explained by the
two opposite eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on the wage rate as exposed in the theoretical section.
193.2 Results
Four graphs are provided for each simulation. The horizontal axis corresponds to the marginal tax rate.
The vertical axis reports respectively the percentage variations with respect to the initial situation for
the wage rate W, the working hours H, the unemployment rate U and social economic eﬃciency  .
3.2.1 The benchmark


































Figure 2: The eﬀects (in percentage) of a modiﬁcation in the marginal tax rate (holding constant the
average tax rate) in the benchmark case.
The results are displayed in Figure 2. A higher marginal tax rate decreases working hours through
the traditional labor supply substitution eﬀect. The wage rate also decreases through the standard
wage moderating and the scale economy eﬀects but this variation is smaller than the variation in
working hours. However, this small decrease compensates for the decrease in working hours and leads
to a lower unemployment rate. This result is due to the fact that the initial wage rate W is high with
respect to the worker’s productivity Y . Therefore, the increase in the hourly proﬁt compensates for
the decrease in per head proﬁt emerging from the lower scale economies. The modiﬁcations in the total
net product are essentially driven by the working hours variations and the increase in the marginal
20tax rate deteriorates the government budget. From a social eﬃciency point of view, the decrease in
working hours dominates therefore the decrease in the unemployment rate. As a consequence, a central
planner would be confronted with an objective’s conﬂict between the reduction in the unemployment
rate and the increase in economic eﬃciency: An increase in tax progression does not appear to be a
“free lunch” as was suggested by Pissarides (1998) 22.
3.2.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I investigate to what extent the results obtained in the benchmark case are sensitive
to the parameters of the model.
The theoretical analysis suggests that the unemployment utility component and the level of utility
in unemployment play an important role for the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on unemployment. I
therefore provide a sensitivity analysis concerning these unemployment utility parameters. Finally, I
propose a sensitivity analysis with respect to the elasticity of labor supply.
The inﬂuence of the unemployment compensation.
The benchmark case shows that from an unemployment point of view, the standard wage mod-
erating and the scale economy eﬀects dominate the labor supply substitution eﬀect. However, the
theoretical analysis suggests that when the marginal tax rate increases, the worker’s rent decreases
more in the ﬁxed unemployment utility regime. As a consequence, worker’s resistance to a wage rate
decrease is more severe. It seems therefore interesting to analyze the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate
variations when ρ is lower than 0.4. The form of the curves obtained in the benchmark case is not
aﬀected for a large range of ρ values. Thus, I restrict my analysis to the extreme case of ρ = 0 which
is displayed in Figure 3 23.
For a ﬁxed utility in unemployment, the wage rate is less aﬀected by the modiﬁcation in the
marginal tax rate than in the benchmark case. Thus, the decrease in the wage rate implies a reduction
in the unemployment rate as long as the marginal tax rate increases from 53% (its initial value) to
22Indeed, Pissarides (1998) explains that “a reform of the employment tax structure from regressive to progressive can
be one of the very few free lunches that one encounters in the analysis of the economic policy” (p. 177).
23This case should be analyzed only for individuals whose unemployment spell period is suﬃciently long i.e. for those
whose unemployment rate is higher than 10%, the benchmark value. However, Figure 3 is not fundamentally modiﬁed
when the initial unemployment rate is signiﬁcantly increased (in particular, the graph is very close to the one presented
here when the unemployment rate is equal to 30% and corresponds to an unemployment spell duration of 25 months).


































Figure 3: The eﬀects (in percentage) of a modiﬁcation in the marginal tax rate (holding constant the
average tax rate) for a ﬁxed utility in unemployment (ρ = 0).
64%. When the marginal tax rate increases more, the reduction in the wage rate is shrunk since the net
replacement ratio eﬀect becomes more important. Moreover, since the wage rate does not vary very
much for a higher marginal tax rate, the loss due to smaller scale economies on the sunk vacancy costs
decreases the labor demand and increases unemployment. However, these results are solely obtained
for a quasi-totally ﬁxed utility in unemployment. Our benchmark results seem therefore quite robust
to this dimension.
The sensitivity analysis concerning the unemployment utility level seems also interesting. First,
the ﬁgures provided in Martin (1996) refer only to average evaluations. Some population can have
access to conditional revenues due to their family situation and these revenues can strongly aﬀect
their replacement ratio. Secondly, the parameter
_
B can be interpreted as a pure utility of leisure or as
domestic production. These dimensions are diﬃcult to take into account in a statistic evaluation but
they might play an important role in the agents’ decisions. Therefore, I investigate the eﬀects of the
marginal tax rate when the total net replacement ratio is increased from 0.65 to 0.7 24. The simulations,
24It is not possible to set a higher value since the equilibrium existence conditions would no longer hold.
22not reported here, show that the results are not fundamentally aﬀected by this modiﬁcation.
































Figure 4: The eﬀects (in percentage) of a modiﬁcation in the marginal tax rate (holding constant the
average tax rate) when the utility in unemployment is ﬁxed (ρ = 0) and higher than the benchmark
case.
However, the wage rate and the unemployment rate variation curves are aﬀected when one considers
simultaneously that utility in unemployment is completely ﬁxed and that the level of the total net
replacement ratio is higher than in the benchmark. This case is displayed in Figure 4 25. The curve
describing the evolution of the unemployment rate is inverted with respect to the benchmark case
(Figure 2). The importance of this modiﬁcation is explained by the wage rate variation. When the
marginal tax rate is higher than 57%, the decrease in working hours increases strongly the replacement
ratio, the workers resistance to a decrease in the wage rate is stronger and the wage rate increases when
the marginal tax rate is further increased. Thus, the proﬁt per head is reduced through lower scale
economies and through a reduction in the hourly proﬁt. This explains why the unemployment rate
increases signiﬁcantly with the marginal tax rate. Moreover, since the conﬂict between the eﬀects on
the unemployment rate and the total net product disappears, it seems that a decrease in the marginal
tax rate would be convenient for these populations.
25In the case where the unemployment beneﬁt is not totally ﬁxed, the curves are similar to Figure 4 as long as ρ < 0.07.
23The inﬂuence of the labor supply elasticity.
The conﬂict between an economic eﬃciency objective and an unemployment rate objective might
be driven by the labor supply elasticity η. However, as explained in the calibration section, empirical
evaluations of this elasticity diﬀer with the category of population studied. It seems therefore necessary
to provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to this elasticity. I take an elasticity equal to 0.2. In
order to assess the inﬂuence of the labor supply elasticity on the eventual conﬂict between an economic
eﬃciency and an unemployment objective, I restrict my analysis to the extreme case of a total net
replacement ratio equal to 0.7 and a totally ﬁxed unemployment utility (ρ = 0). The results, not
reported here, are approximately the same as in the benchmark case: The shapes of the curves are
identical and solely the extent of the variation rates is aﬀected. Since the labor supply elasticity is
lower, the working hours diminish less. The net replacement ratio is thus less aﬀected and the standard
wage moderating and the scale economy eﬀects dominate the negative impact of the labor supply on
the possibilities for ﬁrms to recover their vacancy costs.
In sum, three conditions have to be simultaneously satisﬁed for an increase in the marginal tax
rate to reduce economic eﬃciency and increase the unemployment rate: A total wage suﬃciently
sensitive to the marginal tax rate, a suﬃciently high level of utility in unemployment and an utility in
unemployment largely disconnected from the net wage. These three conditions seem to be appropriate
only for some married women or lonely mothers. When one of these conditions is not satisﬁed,
an increase in the marginal tax rate reduces simultaneously the unemployment rate and economic
eﬃciency. Finally, the sensitivity analysis has suggested that it is particularly important to distinguish
the two polar unemployment utility regimes when one studies the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate with
endogenous hours.
3.2.3 The optimal marginal tax rate
This section analyzes the main forces driving the optimal marginal tax rate (taking constant the
average tax rate). To do this, I extend the range of marginal tax rates on the horizontal axis of the
Figures. Since the value of the labor supply elasticity is quite controversial, Figure 5 depicts the eﬀects
of marginal tax rates for diﬀerent labor supply elasticities, the other variables remaining set at their
benchmark value. Three diﬀerent values of the labor supply elasticity are represented: Solid lines
24Labor Supply Elas. 0.001 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Benchmark W
Y 96.3 97.2 97.9 98.5 99.0 99.5
T∗
m 86 48 39 42 47 51
β = 0.3 W
Y 91.8 93.7 95.3 96.7 97.9 98.9
T∗
m 68 37 35 40 46 51
Low Unempl. W
Y 93.8 94.7 95.4 96.0 96.5 96.9
Utility (0.4) T∗
m 74 35 24 24 27 31
Fixed Unempl. W
Y 96.3 97.2 97.9 98.5 99.0 99.5
Utility T∗
m 89 50 35 33 35 39
Table 3: Optimal Marginal Tax rates w.r.t the elasticity of labor supply. All the results are given is
percentage.
For the low unemployment utility case, total net replacement ratio decreases from 0.65 to 0.4 but the distribution
between the indexed and the ﬁxed utility of the benchmark remains ﬁxed. For the ﬁxed unemployment utility
case, total initial utility in unemployment is the same as in the benchmark (i.e. the total net replacement ratio
remains equal 0.65).
correspond to an elasticity of 0.4, dotted lines to an elasticity of 0.2 and dashed lines to an elasticity
close to zero (0.001). Table 3 considers even more labor supply elasticity values to emphasize more
precisely the eﬀects of the exogenous variables on the optimal marginal tax rate. At this stage, it
should be pointed out that the values obtained in Table 3 should not be considered as the marginal
tax rate that a French government should implement. The values should rather be taken as illustrative.
Several striking properties are put forward in Figure 5 and Table 3. First, Figure 5 indicates that
the shapes of the social eﬃciency curves are very diﬀerent. In the benchmark case (with a labor supply
elasticity of 0.4), the social eﬃciency curve is an inversed-U shape with respect to the marginal tax rate
and the optimal marginal tax rate is equal to 47%. When the labor supply elasticity is equal to 0.2,
the shape of the social eﬃciency curve is the same but its slope is much less important and the optimal
marginal tax rate is equal to 39%. When the elasticity is close to 0, the shape of the social eﬃciency
curve is very diﬀerent: It is increasing in the marginal tax rate (in the range considered in Figure 5) and
the conﬂict between the evolution of the unemployment rate and the total net product disappears 26.
These properties imply that the relation between the labor supply elasticity and the optimal marginal
tax rate T∗
m is not monotonic (see Table 3). The U-shaped curve of the optimal marginal tax rate with
respect to the labor supply elasticity can be explained as follows. When the labor supply elasticity is
very small, hours are ﬁxed and solely the trading externalities are important for economic eﬃciency.
26In Figure 5, I consider that the Hosios condition is satisﬁed i.e. that β = γ = 0.5. Other simulations (not reported
here) indicate that the results are not signiﬁcantly modiﬁed when β takes other values in the range [0.2;0.8] (keeping γ
equal to 0.5).

































Figure 5: Sensivity analysis with respect to the labor supply elasticity η (other baseline parame-
ters keeping their benchmark value). Solid, dotted and dashed lines for η equal to 0.4, 0.2 and 0,
respectively.
In this case, the higher the average tax rate and the level of utility in unemployment, the higher the
wage bargained and the lower the labor demand and economic eﬃciency. As shown in Hungerbühler
et al. (2005), when the Hosios condition is satisﬁed, this implies that the marginal tax rate should
compensate for these negative eﬀects. Thus, the optimal marginal tax rate increases with the average
tax rate and utility in unemployment. This explains why the optimal marginal tax rate is so high when
the labor supply elasticity is nil (see Table 3). When the labor supply elasticity increases but remains
lower than 0.2, an increase in the marginal tax rate harms working hours and thus the possibilities for
ﬁrms to recover their vacancy costs. This explains why the optimal marginal tax rate decreases with
the labor supply elasticity. However, when the labor supply elasticity is higher than 0.3, the initial
wage rate-productivity W
Y ratio becomes very high (see Table 3). This is due to the increase in the
disutility of work for which workers need to be compensated for and because of the net replacement
ratio eﬀect. Thus, since the wage rate variations are approximately the same for each elasticity of the
labor supply (see Figure 5), a decrease in the wage rate is necessary so that the hourly proﬁt, the
labor demand, the employment and the government budget do not decline too much. This is made
26possible by ﬁxing a higher marginal tax rate (see Figure 5) and this explains why the optimal marginal
tax rate is pushed up. Therefore, the complementarity between the eﬀects on hours, wage rates and
unemployment explains why the evolution of the optimal marginal tax rate with the elasticity of the
labor supply is not monotonic. This result contrasts with Sørensen (1999) who ﬁnds in eﬃciency wage
and union models that the higher the labor supply elasticity, the lower optimal tax progression. The
qualitative diﬀerence with the results of Sørensen is explained by the existence of the scale economy
and net replacement ratio eﬀects in my model.
The second interesting result concerns the sensitivity of the optimal marginal tax rate to the
introduction of an endogenous labor supply. The optimal marginal tax rate is very high when the
elasticity of the labor supply is close to zero (0.001) but it decreases sharply even for relatively low
elasticities (0.1). When the labor supply elasticity is higher than 0.1, the optimal marginal tax rate
varies less with the labor supply elasticity. This points out some oﬀsetting eﬀects of the marginal tax
rate on hours and the wage rate. These eﬀects are due to the impact of the marginal tax rate on the
initial ratio W
Y and on the variation of the wage rate.
Third, as shown in Table 3, the optimal marginal tax rate increases with the worker’s bargaining
power (keeping γ equal to 0.5). This result is in line with Boone and Bovenberg (2002) and Hunger-
bühler (2004) who demonstrate that when the labor supply intensive margin is ﬁxed, the optimal
marginal tax rate decreases with the diﬀerence between the elasticity of the matching function and
the worker’s bargaining power. In fact, when the Hosios condition is satisﬁed, trading externalities
are eﬃciently allocated when the intensive labor supply is exogenous. When the worker’s bargaining
power is lower than the matching function elasticity, the initial wage rate-productivity ratio is too low.
This induces too many ﬁrms to enter the market and implies too high total vacancy costs. Decreasing
the marginal tax rate implies a higher wage rate and allows thus to compensate for this negative eﬀect.
However, the importance of this property decreases with the labor supply elasticity since the variation
in hours becomes more important for economic eﬃciency.
Fourth, the higher the level of utility in unemployment, the higher the optimal marginal tax rate.
This result is in line with Pissarides (1983). In particular, I generalize the result of Pissarides by
endogenizing labor demand and working hours. The basic mechanisms is the same as in Pissarides
(1983): A higher level of utility in unemployment implies a higher reservation wage and pushes the
wage rate up. Higher marginal tax rates compensate for this negative eﬀect.
27Finally, the degree of indexation of the utility in unemployment on the net wage has not a
monotonic impact on the optimal marginal tax rate. When the elasticity of labor supply is low,
the net replacement rate eﬀect is weak and the (negative) diﬀerences between the optimal marginal
tax rate in the benchmark case and in the case of ﬁxed utility in unemployment is low (3 percentage
points, see Table 3). The higher the labor supply elasticity, the stronger is the net replacement rate
eﬀect. As shown in Figure 4, this implies some pressure for an increase in the wage rate when the
marginal tax rate is pushed up. Thus, the optimal marginal tax rate declines.
4 Conclusion
This article has shown that the theoretical eﬀects of an increase in the marginal tax rate on wages
and employment are ambiguous. The model has put forward three theoretical contributions. First, I
have shown that working hours aﬀect the wage bargained through a scale economy eﬀect. This eﬀect
reinforces the standard wage moderating eﬀect of a higher marginal tax rate previously put forward in
the literature considering imperfect labor markets. Second, according to the relation between utility in
unemployment and the net wage, an increase in the marginal tax rate can have negative or ambiguous
eﬀects on the wage rate. These results have suggested that a higher marginal tax rate might increase
the wage rate when utility in unemployment is ﬁxed and initial utility in unemployment and/or the
labor supply elasticity are suﬃciently high. This case applies to the individuals that only receive an
assistance beneﬁt when they loose their job but also to the individuals characterized by a high utility of
leisure. The numerical simulations have conﬁrmed these intuitions and have shown that small changes
in the marginal tax rate can have important impacts on unemployment and economic eﬃciency. They
have also suggested that for a large part of the population, higher marginal tax rates might decrease
the unemployment rate but at the expense of lower economic eﬃciency. Moreover, the variation of the
optimal marginal tax rate with the labor supply elasticity is not monotonic. Thus, since the empirical
values of the labor supply elasticity are controversial and might be very diﬀerent across groups (in
particular men and women), it seems very diﬃcult to draw general policy recommendations.
Some research avenues might follow my paper. My theoretical results are diﬀerent from those
obtained by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004). This is particularly surprising since union models have
driven to radically opposite results: When the agent’s utility function is separable (Sørensen (1999)),
28a higher marginal tax rate improves employment but when the agent’s utility function is not separable
(Fuest and Huber (2002)), the eﬀects on employment are no longer always positive. In this perspective,
it would be interesting to conduct the analysis with a general utility function in order to explain
these diﬀerences. Furthermore, I have shown that the level of utility in unemployment has a major
importance for the results. Taking simultaneously the intensive and the extensive labor supply margins
would be interesting. However, it would probably be much more complex to stress the theoretical
mechanisms of a higher marginal tax rate in such a model.
Appendix
A The existence of the equilibrium
I determine the existence of the equilibrium by comparing the wage rate levels given in relations WS
and PS for θ → 0 and θ → +∞. This is done by using the wage formation relation (8) (or (9)) and
the labor demand (10) after having substituted the working hours relation (6). For the labor demand
relation, I obtain :
lim
θ→0
WPS = Y and lim
θ→+∞
WPS = −∞




Y β (1 − Tm) + (1 − β)
(1−Tm)Y
α




Thus, for θ → +∞, one has WWS > WPS. For θ → 0, one has WWS < WPS if
Y (1 − β)
￿
(1−Tm)
α − (1 − ρ)(1 − TM)
￿




α − (1 − ρ)(1 − TM)
￿
< 0.


























One can easily check that theses conditions are equivalent to the conditions ensuring positive rents
29for employees and ﬁrms.
B Determination of the partial and total elasticities with respect to
the marginal tax rate
The model is deﬁned by three endogenous variables: The wage rate, the working hours and the labor
market tightness. The equilibrium is determined by the working hours relation (6), the aggregate
labor demand (10) and the wage formation relations, (8) or (9) depending on the regime analyzed.
In this appendix, I log-diﬀerentiate each relation with respect to the endogenous variables and the
marginal tax rates.
I start with the relations common to the two regimes. The small letters correspond to the diﬀer-
entiated variables. One has thus h = dH









Jf,W ∗ w − h) +
∧
θ = 0 (16)
with ε
p
Jf,W = − W
Y −W < 0. The relation deﬁning the working hours becomes:




I have now to distinguish the wage formation relations in each regime.
B.1 The ﬁxed net replacement ratio regime
The log diﬀerentiation of relation (8) 27 gives:
w = ε
p















(1 − β)(1 − ρ)(1 − TM)g(θ)







(1 − β)θg′ (θ)β(
1 − Tm
α
− (1 − ρ)(1 − TM))







It is straightforward to show that ε
p
W,Tm < 0 and 0 < ε
p




− (1 − ρ)(1 − TM) < 0.
Denoting by ξI,Tm =
dI/I
dTm/Tm, the total elasticity of the variable I with respect to the marginal tax
rate Tm, one can retrieve relation (11) by using the relations (16), (17) and (18).
B.2 The ﬁxed unemployment utility regime











In order to simplify the analysis, I deﬁne X (H) ≡
_
B






β (X (H) − Y (1 − TM)) −
(1 − β)(1 − TM)g(θ)Y
α
￿
[(1 − β)(1 − TM)g(θ) + β (1 − Tm)]
￿











(1 − β)(1 − Tm)β(
Y (1 − Tm)
α
+ X (H) − Y (1 − TM))θg′ (θ)
[(1 − β)(1 − TM)g(θ) + β (1 − Tm)]
￿











(1 − β)g(θ)X (H)






+ (1 − β)g(θ)X (H)
It is straightforward to show that ε
p
W,Tm < 0, 0 < ε
p
W,θ (since one has g′ (θ) < 0 and
￿
Y (1−Tm)
α − Y (1 − TM) + X (H)
￿
< 0 to get an equilibrium and as long as Tm ≤ 1, which is a
reasonable assumption) and ε
p
W,H < 0.
28To simplify the log-diﬀerenciation and highlight the diﬀerences between each regime, the term a0 ∗ H (Tm)
α−1 is
replaced by Y (1 − Tm) but H (Tm) in the term
_
B
H(Tm) of relation (9) is not substituted.
31C The impact of
_
B on the sign of ξW,Tm





















, its denominator being positive and the
sign of its numerator being ambiguous. The sign of ξW,Tm is therefore dictated by the evolution of its





































Y ((1 − Tm)β + (1 − β)g(θ)(1 − TM))
￿










(1 − β)(1 − Tm)βθg′ (θ)





















+ (1 − β)g(θ)X
￿2 < 0
with
Λ = −(1 − β)g(θ) < 0
Therefore when
_
B (and thus X (H)) increases, the term ε
p







ξH,Tm is less negative and the term ε
p





The aim of this appendix is twofold. First, the wage setting relation is rewritten in order to take into
account that the utility in unemployment has a ﬁxed component
_
B and a net wage indexed component
32ρ(S − T (S)) with S = W ∗ H, the total wage. Thus, one obtains:
β (1 − Tm)(Y H − S) = (1 − β)
￿








Second, I point out the expression of the total wage elasticity with respect to the marginal tax
rate. The method for determining the elasticity ξS
1−Tm =
dS/S
d(1−Tm)/(1−Tm) is close to the one used in
Appendix B. I diﬀerentiate working hours, the labor demand (PS) and the wage formation relation
(WS). The diﬀerence with the theoretical evaluation in Appendix B is that the diﬀerentiations are
made with respect to the total wage. The labor demand relation writes now:
S = Y ∗ H −
C (r + λ)
q(θ)
Diﬀerentiated, it becomes (denoting s = dS
S )
Y ∗ H ∗ h − S ∗ s




After the diﬀerentiation of the wage formation relation (19), and by taking into account of relation
(20), of the diﬀerentiated working hours relation (h =
d(1−Tm)
1−Tm ∗ 1










one obtains after some basic mathematics :
ξS
1−Tm =
β (Y ∗ H − S) +
β∗Y ∗H











β + (1 − β)g(θ)
￿
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